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BULLY NO MORE: WHY TRADEMARK OWNERS
ENGAGE IN TRADEMARK OVERREACH AND HOW TO
PREVENT IT
Quynh La*
Abstract: At its core, trademark law exists as a tool for consumer protection. Thus,
trademark owners use policing and enforcement to maintain a trademark’s goodwill, which in
turn protects consumers from confusion. But policing and enforcement can lead to trademark
overreach and bullying—which undermine the goal of trademark law. This Comment explains
that trademark owners are incentivized to engage in aggressive enforcement tactics because
courts weigh enforcement efforts in favor of trademark strength. And strong trademarks
receive strong protection because such marks are more likely to succeed in trademark
infringement litigation. To curb trademark bullying and realign trademark law with its
consumer protection purpose, this Comment argues that courts assessing trademark strength
should focus on evidence of marketing strategies and consumer perception rather than
trademark enforcement.

INTRODUCTION
At its core, U.S. law viewed trademarks as a consumer protection
mechanism.1 Trademarks allow companies to communicate information
to the market, while trademark law prevents other parties “from using
similar marks to deceive or confuse consumers.”2 They reduce
information and transaction costs by allowing consumers to distinguish
the source of goods and the quality associated with that source.3 Thus,
many also view trademarks as “repositories or symbols of . . . goodwill.”4
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank
Professor Robert Gomulkiewicz for his suggestions, advice, and guidance on this Comment. I would
also like to thank Washington Law Review’s Editorial Staff for their insight, thoughts, and
dedication—particularly Emma Healey, Olivia Hagel, Sarah Cooper, and the Managing Editor
Department. Finally, I would like to thank John Macaluso for supporting my journey to law school
and sparking my interest in trademarks.
1. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law,
86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 550. For example, “[t]he brand name Coca-Cola . . . informs the consumer of the maker of
the soft drink beverage as well as the taste that they can expect.” 2 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A.
LEMLEY, ROBERT P. MERGES & SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2020, at 895 (2020).
4. Bone, supra note 1, at 549. Robert G. Bone is a Professor of Law at Boston University School
of Law. He discusses the tension between viewing trademark law as a mechanism for protecting
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For example, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Shawn is in
the market for a new pair of shoes. Shawn picks out a pair with three
stripes on the side of each shoe. Shawn looks at the label and packaging
and identifies that Adidas created the shoes. If Shawn is happy with the
shoes, Shawn may continue buying shoes with the three-stripes mark or
the Adidas label. If Shawn does not like the shoes, Shawn may avoid
buying shoes from Adidas in the future and instead buy from a
different brand.
Because trademarks represent a company and the goodwill it holds
amongst consumers, trademark owners have an interest in protecting their
marks.5 Trademark owners protect against misuse through policing to
enforce their exclusive rights in their trademark.6 Such enforcement
efforts help ensure that third parties do not profit off a trademark’s
goodwill by infringing on the trademark. Trademark owners may also
wish to enforce their trademarks to maintain a trademark’s strength.
Failure to enforce trademark rights against improper third-party use can
cause consumers to stop associating the mark with that particular
company’s goods or services.7 This leads to erosion of the trademark’s
strength and possible loss of the trademark.8
But trademark enforcement sometimes goes too far. Commentators
have begun to identify and condemn instances of trademark overreach and
bullying.9 However, other commentators note that alleged trademark
bullies are merely rational decisionmakers.10 As this Comment argues,
U.S. trademark law incentivizes trademark owners to over-enforce their
marks because courts view evidence of enforcement as proof of a strong
trademark and consequently afford greater protection to aggressively
enforced marks.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines the history,
consumers versus goodwill. Ultimately, Professor Bone suggests that trademark law should focus on
trademark’s information transmission goals and protect goodwill only when doing so promotes
information transmission. Id. at 621–22.
5. Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Erik D. Hille, The Puzzle in Financing with Trademark Collateral, 56
HOUS. L. REV. 365, 373 (2018).
6. Intell. Prop. Prac. Grp., Mintz Levin, A Primer on Policing Your Trademark, NAT’L L. REV.
(Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/primer-policing-your-trademark
[https://perma.cc/PZ4D-DJKQ].
7. Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1789, 1825 (2007).
8. Id.; see infra section II.A.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See, e.g., Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-of-Publicity Law,
96 B.U. L. REV. 1293, 1316–22 (2016) (asserting that, because of doctrines created under U.S.
trademark law, “many cases of purported bullying involve trademark holders making rational
attempts to maximize the value of their assets”).
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purpose, and basic requirements of U.S. trademark ownership and
registration. Part II provides an overview of trademark policing and
enforcement. This Part analyzes the incentives that drive trademark
owners to police and common methods of enforcement. Part III discusses
the rising issue of trademark bullying and analyzes Adidas’s particularly
aggressive trademark enforcement tactics as a case study.11 This Part also
discusses how courts consider trademark policing and enforcement when
determining trademark strength and explains how this practice
incentivizes trademark bullying. Finally, Part IV proposes that courts
refrain from using evidence of trademark policing and enforcement when
weighing trademark strength. Instead, courts should focus on marketing
efforts and consumer perception when assessing trademark strength. Such
an approach would better align with trademark law’s consumer
protection goals.
I.

UNITED STATES TRADEMARK LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Trademark law did not always exist as it currently does in the United
States. Early trademark law was rooted in consumer protection and
enforced based on tort claims.12 Eventually, trademark law was codified
in the 1940s.13 U.S. trademark ownership currently requires use of a
distinctive mark in commerce.14 This Part briefly explores the history and
structure of trademark law in the United States.
A.

Development of United States Trademark Law

Trademarks “date from prehistoric times.”15 During the early Roman
Empire and late Middle Ages, merchants and craftspeople began
identifying their goods with markings to convey competency and
quality.16 These markings became increasingly important during the
Industrial Revolution—the ease of creating goods led to the rise of third11. See infra section III.A.
12. “U.S. trademark law is based primarily on a policy of protecting customers from confusion:
trademark law is seen as a form of consumer protection.” 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:1.75 (5th ed. 2021); see also Bone, supra note 1, at
564–65 (describing the different ways American courts treated technical and non-technical
trademarks during the late nineteenth century).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1051; Desai & Rierson, supra note 7, at 1815.
14. Hannah Brennan, The Cost of Confusion: The Paradox of Trademarked Pharmaceuticals, 22
MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
15. Thomalyn Epps, Trademark Law: How We Got to Where We Are Today, 19 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 3, 3 (2010); see also MENELL ET AL., supra note 3, at 891 (“Trademarks have existed
for almost as long as trade itself.”).
16. Epps, supra note 15, at 3.
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party retailers, and “face-to-face transaction[s] between consumer and
manufacturer . . . became obsolete.”17 Thus, in addition to evidencing the
quality of a good or service, trademarks became a mechanism for
consumer protection.18 The change in purchasing norms meant a greater
need for consumer protection because consumers often did not know a
manufacturer’s identity.19 Consumers therefore relied on trademarks to
inform them of the source of the goods they purchased.20
In fact, there were calls for federal trademark protection even in the
early years of the nation. For example, Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson received a petition for a federal trademark law from a
Massachusetts sailcloth manufacturer in 1791.21 Although Jefferson
agreed with the idea of such a law, Congress did not take any further
action on federal trademark legislation.22 For decades, the matter was left
to the states and common law.23
Federal trademark protection emerged rather belatedly in the U.S.
compared to other areas of intellectual property law.24 Originally, the
common law of fraud, rooted in theories of consumer protection law, was
the main source of protection for most trademarks.25 Trademarks were not
typically thought of as property rights; rather, lawsuits involving
trademarks were brought as unfair competition or consumer deception tort
claims.26 During this time, trademark protection was very narrow—courts
generally found infringement only in cases involving a sale of identical

17. Id. at 4.
18. Raveen Obhrai, Traditional and Contemporary Functions of Trademarks, 12 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 16, 16 (2001) (“Impersonal transactions using retailers and middlemen replaced direct
relations between producers and consumers. Trademarks began to assume importance . . . [because
they] identified the original manufacturers as goods passed from them through the hands of the
middleman to ultimate purchasers.”).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Zvi S. Rosen, Federal Trademark Law: From Its Beginnings, 11 LANDSLIDE 34, 35 (2019).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. MENELL ET AL., supra note 3, at 891. The first trademark infringement case did not arise until
1825, and the first injunction for trademark infringement was not issued until 1844. Id. (citing
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 257 (2d ed. 1985)). In the early days of
American trade, the economy was still rooted in land and produce, so trademarks were not valued for
protection of either brands or consumers, but rather for mercantile and industrial applications. Id.
(citing FRIEDMAN, supra, at 257).
25. Id. at 892–93; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
26. MENELL ET AL., supra note 3, at 892–93; MCCARTHY, supra note 12; see also Bone, supra note
1, at 564–65 (explaining that only technical trademarks were thought of as a property and were
protected under tort law for unauthorized appropriation, while non-technical trademarks were
protected by unfair competition laws).
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goods using identical marks.27
At the end of the Civil War, the U.S. entered into “treaties for reciprocal
protection of trademarks with Russia, Belgium, and France.”28 Those
treaties propelled the need for a federal trademark registration regime.29
Thus, in 1870, Congress passed the Trademark Act pursuant to its powers
under the Intellectual Property Clause.30
However, this long-awaited registration system was short-lived. In
1879, the Supreme Court decided the Trade-Mark Cases,31 ruling that the
Trademark Act was unconstitutional because the Intellectual Property
Clause does not allow Congress to regulate trademarks.32 The U.S. was
left with no trademark registration system once again. Yet, the Court
pointed Congress to a light at the end of the tunnel. It left open the
question of whether Congress may regulate trademarks under the
Commerce Clause.33 Congress followed the Court’s guidance and passed
legislation for federal trademark registration and protection in 1946—the
Lanham Act.34
In large part, the Lanham Act aims to protect consumers by preventing
confusion regarding the source or quality of trademarked goods and
services.35 Trademarks represent the goodwill that trademark owners earn
27. MENELL ET AL., supra note 3, at 893.
28. Rosen, supra note 21, at 35.
29. Id.
30. Sondra Levine, The Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22, 22–23
(2010); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198–217 (revising the existing patent and copyright
statutes of the time and introducing trademarks to U.S. federal law), invalidated by Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Trademark Act was an appendage of the Act of
July 8, 1870, which was aimed at revising copyright and patent law. Rosen, supra note 21, at 35. To
date, it remains the only bill in U.S. history that revised all three categories of federal intellectual
property law at once. Id.
31. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
32. Id. at 93–95. Congress grounded protection for trademark rights in the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to enact laws that “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In 1879, the Supreme Court held that the
statute was unconstitutional in its entirety. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94; Rosen, supra note 21,
at 36. The Court stated that the Intellectual Property Clause protects “inventions and discoveries in
the arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors.” Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93–94. On the
other hand, “[t]he ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery” or “the
fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.” Id. at 94
(emphasis in original).
33. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94–97. The Court hinted that any law passed by Congress to
regulate trademarks under the Commerce Clause may only apply to “commerce with foreign nations,
or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes,” and not commerce within a single state. Id.
at 96.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1051; Desai & Rierson, supra note 7, at 1815.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
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by marketing their products and services.36 Consumers rely on trademarks
that have significant goodwill to identify preferred goods or services.37 In
order to further trademark goodwill and consumer protection, U.S.
trademark law protects the rights attached to trademark ownership.38
B.

Trademark Ownership Requirements: Use in Commerce and
Distinctiveness

Under the Lanham Act, a trademark is a “word, name, symbol, or
device”—or any combination of those—that identifies the source of goods
or services and distinguishes the goods or services from those of another.39
Though the Lanham Act created a federal trademark registration system,
it does not require registration for trademark owners to receive protection
for their marks.40 Instead, to achieve ownership—and the protections
associated with ownership—a trademark must meet two requirements.41
First, the trademark must be used in commerce as a source identifier.42
Second, the trademark must be distinctive.43 As long as a trademark meets
these requirements, it receives protection under the U.S. trademark law.44
And that protection grants the owner exclusive rights to the mark and the
ability to prevent other parties from using the mark with the same, or
From its earliest beginnings in legal history, trademark law has had the dual goals of both
protecting property in a trademark and protecting consumers from confusion and
deception . . . . [I]n a Report accompanying passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, the Senate
emphasized that the Act had those two goals.
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 2:22.
36. Nguyen & Hille, supra note 5, at 397; Bone, supra note 1, at 549.
37. Nguyen & Hille, supra note 5, at 397; Bone, supra note 1, at 549.
38. Most importantly, trademark owners generally have the right to exclude others from using their
trademarks for the same or similar goods or services in a certain geographic area by filing a lawsuit
for trademark infringement. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., PROTECTING YOUR
TRADEMARK: ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 9 (2020), [hereinafter
USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
trademarks/basics/BasicFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT44-9YM5]; see also MCCARTHY, supra note
12, § 2:10 (explaining that “a trademark is undoubtedly a ‘right to exclude’”).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
40. USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK, supra note 38, at 11–12.
41. Brennan, supra note 14, at 6 (“Under the Lanham Act, producers may technically obtain a
trademark on any distinctive word, name, symbol, device, packaging, or design as long as the
producer uses that mark in commerce to signal the good’s source.”); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051(b)(3)(B), (D), 1127; Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks:
An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 955 (2018).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
43. Id.; Brennan, supra note 14, at 6–7.
44. Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 879 (2017) (“The [trademark] right exists because of use; the
registration then may add to the scope of the right.” (emphasis in original)).
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substantially similar, goods within the same geographic location.45
Trademark owners can secure further protections by registering their
trademark.46 Marks must meet the basic requirements for trademark
protection to be registered: use in commerce and distinctiveness.47
Under the first requirement for U.S. trademark protection, a mark must
be used in commerce in a manner that identifies the source of the goods
or services.48 The U.S. has adopted a first-to-use system, giving trademark
ownership and protection to those who first use a distinctive mark in
commerce.49 Thus, the first user of a trademark generally becomes the
trademark owner and may prevent others from subsequent use of the same
or similar mark.50
45. USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK, supra note 38, at 9; MCCARTHY, supra note 12,
§ 2:10.
46. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 878–81. For enhanced rights, trademark owners can register their
marks at either the state or federal level. USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK, supra note 38, at
11–12. Discussion of state trademark registration is outside of the scope of this Comment. Trademark
owners with federally registered marks are granted benefits and rights beyond those afforded by state
registration or common law protection. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 876. This includes “a presumption
of validity, and under certain circumstances that presumption is irrebuttable,” “nationwide priority
over other users even without nationwide use,” “eligibility for assistance from the Customs Service
in avoiding infringing imports,” and “ability to use the U.S. registration as the basis for extending
protection in other countries.” Id.; see also USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK, supra note 38,
at 11–12 (listing the advantages of federal trademark registration). When a trademark owner of an
unregistered mark seeks federal protection against infringement or confusingly similar use, the
trademark owner must first show that their claimed mark is valid before seeking to enforce any rights
against another party. MNI Mgmt., Inc. v. Wine King, LLC, 542 F. Supp. 2d 389, 404 (D.N.J. 2008)
(“Unregistered marks have no presumption of validity . . . . Thus, a plaintiff must prove that an
unregistered mark is valid and protectable.”).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(3)(B), (D).
48. Grounding the Lanham Act in the Commerce Clause means that actual use of the trademark in
commerce is the touchstone of U.S. federal trademark protection. Federal registration requires either
use in interstate commerce or between the U.S. and a foreign country. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
U.S. DEP’T OF COM., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 901 (2018) [hereinafter
TMEP], https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/TMEP-900d1e7.html
[https://perma.cc/VRR5-ZDLB]. A trademark registrant must show “bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Thus,
a nominal sale made only to reserve a mark will not fulfill the actual use in commerce requirement.
See, e.g., Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503–04 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that “use
sufficient to register a mark that soon is widely distributed is not necessarily enough to acquire rights
in the absence of registration” and “token use” alone does not give sufficient notice of trademark
ownership); Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that “[t]he phrase ‘trademark use’ means ‘the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in a mark’” (quoting Electro Source, LLC v.
Brandess–Kalt–Aetna Grp., Inc., 458 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2006))). A trademark must identify and
distinguish the goods and services from others’ goods and services and indicate the source of the
goods and services, even if that source is unknown. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
49. Meaghan Annett, When Trademark Law Met Constitutional Law: How a Commercial Speech
Theory Can Save the Lanham Act, 61 B.C. L. REV. 253, 265 (2020).
50. Id.
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The second requirement for trademark protection is distinctiveness.51
Under the distinctiveness requirement, a mark qualifies as a trademark
with federal protection only if it has come “to identify not only the goods
but the source of those goods.”52 A trademark may fulfill this requirement
either through inherent distinctiveness or acquired distinctiveness.53 To
determine whether a trademark is distinctive, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and courts evaluate trademarks along a
spectrum ranging from highly distinctive marks to marks that are the
generic name for goods or services.54
Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are considered inherently
distinctive and do not require any additional showing of acquired
distinctiveness.55 Fanciful marks are terms that are created solely for use
as a trademark and have no previous dictionary meaning.56 Examples of
fanciful marks include KODAK57 for cameras and photographic
products58 or EXXON for oil and gas.59 Arbitrary marks are terms with
common meanings but do not indicate any quality or characteristic of the
goods or services.60 Examples of arbitrary marks include APPLE for
computers61 or AMAZON for an e-commerce company.62 Suggestive
marks are terms that suggest a quality or characteristic of a good or service
but require thought, imagination, and perception to connect them.63
Examples of suggestive marks include IVORY for soap64 or
COPPERTONE for suntan oil.65
Generic terms are on the other end of the distinctiveness spectrum.66 A

51. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Brennan, supra note 14, at 6–7.
52. Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
53. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 41, at 957–58.
54. TMEP, supra note 48, § 1209.01.
55. Id. Marks that are fanciful or arbitrary when used in connection to goods and services are
considered the most distinctive. Id. Suggestive marks come next on the distinctiveness spectrum. Id.
56. Id.
57. Trademark registrations for standard character marks are not case sensitive. See id. § 807.03(a).
For ease of reading, this Comment uses capitalized letters to indicate a word mark that has been
registered with no additional stylizations. Id.
58. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 41, at 957.
59. Id.
60. TMEP, supra note 48, § 1209.01.
61. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 41, at 957.
62. Id.
63. TMEP, supra note 48, § 1209.01.
64. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 41, at 957.
65. Id.
66. TMEP, supra note 48, § 1209.01.
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generic term is the precise definition of a product or service.67 Examples
include APPLE, if used for the sale of apples,68 or COMPUTER, if used
for the sale of computers. A generic term can never function as a
trademark because it cannot designate a particular source.69 A misused
trademark can also become generic over time, thereby losing its trademark
protection—a process called “genericide.”70
Descriptive marks, which are not inherently distinctive, lie somewhere
between highly distinctive marks and generic terms on the distinctiveness
spectrum.71 A mark is descriptive if it describes a good or service, or one
or more of its features, such as its ingredients, quality, function, purpose,
or use.72 An example of a descriptive mark is IPHONE for cellular
phones.73
Because a descriptive term is not inherently distinctive, it is not entitled
to trademark protection until the mark’s owner can show that the term has
acquired a “secondary meaning” beyond its descriptive meaning.74 In
other words, there must be proof that consumers associate the term with
the producer of the product—not merely with the product itself.75 An
applicant can prove this by presenting “any competent evidence.”76 While
the necessary amount or character of evidence varies case by case,77 the
more descriptive a mark the more evidence is necessary to show
secondary meaning.78
67. Id.
68. The trademark APPLE illustrates how the relationship between the mark and the goods or
services can affect trademark distinctiveness. APPLE, as used in conjunction with computers, is
considered arbitrary because there is no actual relationship between computers and the dictionary
definition for “apple.” On the other hand, APPLE is considered a generic term if used in relation to
apples, because the fruit is the dictionary definition of the term. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 809 (2004).
69. TMEP, supra note 48, § 1209.01; In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d
1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Generic terms [are] by definition incapable of indicating source . . . and
can never attain trademark status.”).
70. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 41, at 1028 n.259; see infra section II.A.
71. TMEP, supra note 48, § 1209.01.
72. Id.
73. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 41, at 957.
74. TMEP, supra note 48, § 1212; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
75. Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
76. TMEP, supra note 48, § 1212.01.
77. Id.
78. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has outlined a non-exhaustive
list of factors for the USPTO and courts to consider when determining whether a descriptive mark
has achieved the secondary meaning required for federal trademark protection: (1) the “association of
the [trademark] with a particular source by actual purchasers”; (2) the “length, degree, and exclusivity
of use” of the trademark; (3) the “amount and manner of advertising” performed in conjunction with
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Thus, once a mark meets the definition of a trademark through use in
commerce and distinctiveness, either inherent or acquired, it receives
protection under U.S. trademark law. The trademark owner then has the
exclusive right to use the trademark.
II.

TRADEMARK POLICING AND ENFORCEMENT

The Lanham Act does not create a duty for trademark to police their
marks.79 Indeed, as the USPTO website states, the government will not
police the use of trademarks.80 Instead, “the owner of a registration is
responsible for bringing any legal action to stop a party from using an
infringing mark.”81 Despite the lack of duty to police, the U.S. trademark
system incentivizes trademark policing. Lawyers often advise trademark
owners to diligently protect their marks.82 As such, trademark owners
engage in trademark policing to monitor for unauthorized use of their
marks or confusing similar marks and to prevent misuse that could lead to
genericide.83 This Part discusses the incentives that drive trademark
owners to police and enforce their marks and gives a brief overview of
common methods of enforcement.
the trademark; (4) the “amount of sales and number of customers”; (5) evidence of “intentional
copying”; and (6) any “unsolicited media coverage of the product embodying the mark.” Converse,
Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
79. Dogan, supra note 10, at 1318–19.
80. Trademark Basics, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics [https://perma.cc/YKE7-YXRY].

(Sept.

13,

2018),

81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Ryan Williams, The Ultimate Guide to Brand Protection, RED POINTS,
https://www.redpoints.com/blog/the-ultimate-guide-to-brand-protection/ [https://perma.cc/2HDTACMW] (explaining that a company that sells a trademarked product is “potentially at risk of
counterfeiting” and should “seriously consider employing a brand protection strategy”); Susan
Neuberger Weller, A Primer on Policing Your Trademark, MINTZ (Apr. 10, 2013),
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2251/2013-04-primer-policing-your-trademark
[https://perma.cc/WBN4-MA27] (stating that “[t]rademark owners have a duty to police their mark”
because “the value of marks that are not policed and their associated goodwill are always in danger”);
Crystal Everson, The Basics of Trademark Enforcement, LEGALZOOM (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/the-basics-of-trademark-enforcement [https://perma.cc/L55APEBD] (asserting that trademark owners have a responsibility “to keep an eye out for competitive
products or services using” the owner’s mark because “the law will not police [the owner’s]
trademark”); Sheila Fox Morrison, Trademark Basics—Five Things Everyone Should Know About
Trademarks, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (May 20, 2004), https://www.dwt.com/insights/2004/
05/trademark-basics—five-things-everyone-should-know [https://perma.cc/B9KK-HT2V]
(underscoring that trademark owners have a “responsibility to police and protect [their] trademark[s]
from infringers and careless use of the mark[s]”); Trademark Protection—How a Federal Trademark
Registration Protects Your Brand, GERBEN PERROTT PLLC, https://www.gerbenlaw.com
/university/trademark-protection-purpose-of-trademark-law/ [https://perma.cc/X7P4-RBSD]
(emphasizing that a trademark owner has a “legal duty to police the marketplace for infringement”).
83. Weller, supra note 82.
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Incentives to Police and Enforce

Trademark owners must maintain their marks to retain ownership and
rights.84 Trademark owners who fail to maintain their trademarks risk
losing their trademark rights.85 In a worst-case scenario, this means total
loss of trademark ownership.86 Trademark owners therefore use policing
and enforcement tactics to avoid loss of trademark rights and ownership
through trademark infringement or misuse.87 Trademark infringement
leads to consumer confusion, which erodes a trademark’s value, while
improper trademark use can cause genericide, which can mean loss of
trademark ownership.
Infringement occurs when there is a likelihood that a consumer would
be confused about the source of the good being sold.88 Historically, the
classic case of trademark infringement in the U.S. involved counterfeiting,
where the infringer attempts to pass off goods as coming from a different
source.89 Well into the first half of the twentieth century, when most
people still sold a single product or type of good, trademark protection
was limited to competing goods.90 As companies began to grow and
diversify their products, courts realized that identical or similar
trademarks could confuse consumers even if the marks adorned different
products.91 By the 1960s, courts developed the modern doctrine of noncompeting goods, engaging in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis for both
competing and non-competing goods.92 Thus, in a modern trademark
84. USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK, supra note 38, at 29.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
86. The Lanham Act states that a mark is abandoned—and thus ownership rights are lost—when it
loses its significance as a mark. Id.; see also Marie-Andrée Weiss, Is Adidas Too Agressive at
Enforcing Its Trademarks?, MAW L. (June 30, 2017), http://www.maw-law.com/
uncategorized/adidas-agressive-enforcing-trademarks/ [https://perma.cc/RU6C-5HWQ] (explaining
that trademark owners may lose their rights if they fail “to adequately police the mark against thirdparty use”).
87. USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK, supra note 38, at 29. Trademark maintenance also
includes filing maintenance documents with the USPTO. Id.
88. About Trademark Infringement, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (June 8, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-trademark-infringement [https://perma.cc/V5E2-8HV8].
89. Bone, supra note 1, at 558, 565.
90. MENELL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1027.
91. Id.
92. Id. The doctrine of non-competing goods has expanded to allow for actions under the Lanham
Act for confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship, which acknowledges that while a consumer may
not believe that the trademark owner is the one selling the product, there may be confusion as to
whether the source of the product is affiliated with or sponsored by the trademark owner. Id. at 1027–
28 This expansion has been stimulated by the rise of franchising and trademark licensing, such as
merchandising of goods by sports teams or universities. Id. at 1029–31. The doctrine of non-
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infringement case, trademark confusion may also arise where an infringer
is offering different goods than the trademark owner so long as consumers
might be confused as to the source of the goods.93
Trademark policing and brand enforcement also play crucial roles in
maintaining a mark’s distinctiveness and protecting against genericide.94
Recall that a generic term can never be a trademark because it is, by
nature, not distinctive.95 Relatedly, genericide is a “process by which a
mark that was once highly valuable and unquestionably protectable loses
all trademark status and value.”96 This occurs when “the public
appropriates a trademark and uses it as a generic name for particular types
of goods or services irrespective of its source.”97 Once a mark suffers
genericide, it is no longer protectable.98 Genericide poses an especially
grave risk for trademark owners, because many courts view it as
irreversible—”once generic, always generic.”99 Some common examples
competing goods is related to the theory of central claiming, which “means that even a very clearly
defined image mark may have protection beyond what is depicted in an image of the mark.” Rebecca
Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV.
861, 875 (2011). Rather than confining protection to the image that appears on the trademark
registration, central claiming focuses on “consumers are likely to react to variations on the image.” Id.
93. About Trademark Infringement, supra note 88.
94. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 7, at 1835 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127) (“Trademark holders who
do not pursue infringers may be contributing to the death of their marks via genericide.”); Dogan,
supra note 10, at 1318–19 (noting that fears of genericide “effectively require[s] trademark holders
to pay attention to third-party use of their mark, lest they lose rights in the mark”); INTELL. PROP.
OWNERS INT’L TRADEMARK L. & ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COMM., INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N,
SHAPE TRADE MARKS—AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 39 (2015), https://ipo.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/IPOShapeTrademarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9JE-VRBT] (“Use by others
or improperly licensed use by others can negatively impact the distinctiveness of a mark. Extensive
third party use can lead to the mark becoming generic.”).
95. See supra section I.B.
96. Desai & Rierson, supra note 7, at 1849.
97. Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017).
98. Desai & Rierson, supra note 7, at 1791 (“[U]nder the doctrine of genericide, mark holders are
required to ‘police’ their marks, and failure to do so may lead to a court finding that the sourceidentifying function of the mark no longer exists.”); see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Nationalizing
Trademarks: A New International Trademark Jurisprudence?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 740 &
n.48 (2004) (discussing trademark policing).
99. Desai & Rierson, supra note 7, at 1849 (“Under the ‘once generic, always generic’ theory,
courts refuse to recognize as trademarks source-identifying terms . . . that may have been ‘generic’ at
some point . . . .”); see also Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1358 (11th Cir. 2007)
(noting that “[c]ourts have generally held that a term used generically cannot be appropriated from
the public domain; therefore, even if the name becomes in some degree associated with the source, a
generic mark cannot achieve true secondary meaning”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that the “no matter how much money and effort the
user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has
achieved in securing public identification,” the term cannot be used as a trademark). However, a
handful of older cases indicate that a term that has undergone genericide may regain trademark status
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of trademarks that have suffered genericide are “aspirin,” “escalator,”
and “thermos.”100
When assessing whether a mark has become generic, courts review a
variety of evidence. This can include consumer surveys101 or evidence that
the term is used in the media.102 Additionally, evidence that the alleged
mark owner uses the term in a generic manner may indicate that the term
is generic.103 Similarly, courts may look to whether competitors and others
in the relevant trade use the term generically.104 Though not determinative,
dictionary definitions for a given term could be evidence that a term has
become generic.105 The Seventh Circuit has explained that trademark
owners must police their own marks to combat genericide by preventing
third parties from using their marks generically.106
Even if a trademark owner does not completely lose ownership in the
trademark, certain actions—or inaction—may lead to significant
limitation of trademark rights. For example, failure to take action against
trademark infringement or misuse may contribute to a determination of
if the trademark owner engages in sufficient advertising and marketing so that consumers once again
recognize the term as a source identifier. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3
(5th Cir. 1953) (finding SINGER regained trademark significance for sewing machines). For more on
potential reprotection of marks that have undergone genericide, see generally Peter J. Brody,
Comment, Reprotection for Formerly Generic Trademarks, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 475 (2015).
100. Mary Beth Quirk, 15 Product Trademarks that Have Become Victims of Genericization,
CONSUMER REPS.: CONSUMERIST (July 19, 2014), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/1
5-product-trademarks-that-have-become-victims-of-genericization/ [https://perma.cc/R9K3-97M6].
101. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 525–27 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Berner Int’l Corp., v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982–83 (3d Cir. 1993).
102. See, e.g., Bos. Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008)
(finding the district court erred by overlooking generic media use of “duck tours”); Murphy Door Bed
Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that generic use of “Murphy
bed” in newspapers and magazines indicates the public’s perception that the term is not used as
a trademark).
103. See, e.g., Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 707 (1st Cir. 2007)
(finding that the term “M4” is generic and basing this determination, in part, on the alleged mark
owner’s reference to “M4 type rifles and carbines” in a patent application).
104. See, e.g., Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 297–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding the term “Pilates” is generic based, in part, on use of the term by others in the fitness industry
to identify a type of exercise); Am. Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9, 17,
24–25 (D. Conn. 1962) (finding the term “thermos” is generic based, in part, on competitor use of the
term both descriptively and as a synonym for their own products).
105. Bos. Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 18; see, e.g., Pilates, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 297 (finding the term
“Pilates” is generic based, in part, on dictionary definitions of the term referring to a type of exercise);
Murphy, 874 F.2d at 101 (finding the term “Murphy bed” is generic based, in part, on dictionary
definitions of the term referring to a bed that folds into the wall).
106. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A serious
trademark holder is assiduous in endeavoring to convince dictionary editors, magazine and newspaper
editors, journalists and columnists, judges, and other lexicographically influential persons to avoid
using his trademark to denote anything other than the trademarked good or service.”).
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genericide.107 Such inaction usually does not lead to complete loss of the
mark without other evidence of genericide. However, even if a mark has
not undergone genericide, lack of enforcement against third-party
infringement or misuse may evidence erosion of the mark’s strength.108
Such a determination may limit the scope of protection, because courts
weigh trademark strength when deciding infringement cases.109 Thus, a
weakened mark presents obstacles for future enforcement.110
Failing to take immediate legal action may also have consequences for
future litigation. If a trademark owner fails to take enforcement action
within a reasonable time after discovering infringement, the infringer may
raise the equitable defense of laches in subsequent litigation.111 This
equitable defense prevents a plaintiff from unreasonably postponing legal
action under certain circumstances. 112 Thus, if trademark owners do not
pursue action against infringing activity quickly, they may forfeit the
option to sue later on.
Brand owners ultimately have key incentives to protect their
trademarks against infringement or misuse. By adopting rigorous brand
enforcement strategies, owners maintain trademark strength and value.113
B.

Methods of Enforcement

Once a trademark owner has identified improper trademark use or
infringement through policing, there are several methods of enforcement
available. The most common methods of enforcement are opposition
proceedings, cease and desist letters, and infringement lawsuits.114
Additionally, some trademark owners have begun using unique marketing
107. See Am. Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 17 (highlighting that the trademark owner “did not . . . take
affirmative action to seek out generic uses [of ‘Thermos’] . . . and only protested those which
happened to come to its attention”; thus, the trademark owner “failed to use reasonable diligence to
rescue ‘Thermos’ from being or becoming a . . . generic term.”).
108. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039, 1047 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting
that a mark may lose its significance as an indication of origin if the trademark owner fails to take
action against infringers).
109. Barton Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong Marks: Should Trademark Law
Protect the Strong More than the Weak?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV 1339, 1350 (2017) (noting that courts
“routinely stat[e] that for stronger marks, a wider range of marks is confusingly similar, and that the
strongest marks merit the widest range of protection” and citing supporting cases).
110. Id.; see, e.g., Sweetheart, 743 F.2d at 1047 (stating that “evidence of [the trademark owner’s]
delay or failure to enjoin other manufacturers is not totally irrelevant . . . where [the trademark owner]
has the burden of proving secondary meaning”).
111. Pinkette Clothing, Inc. v. Cosmetic Warriors Ltd., 894 F.3d 1015, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2018).
112. Id.
113. Francis J. Duffin & Bryan S. Watson, Best Practices in Protecting and Enforcing Trademarks,
Copyrights, and Other Intellectual Property Rights, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 132, 132 (2009).
114. Id. at 134.
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strategies aimed at enforcement.
Opposition proceedings take place before the USPTO’s Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).115 Trademark owners often monitor
trademark applications submitted to the USPTO. If a trademark owner
believes a trademark application is confusingly similar to its own mark, it
may oppose registration.116
Most commonly, trademark owners faced with infringement or misuse
of their marks send cease-and-desist letters.117 These letters demand that
the recipient stop infringing or misusing the trademark. Cease-and-desist
letters allow trademark owners to put infringers or misusers on notice of
the owner’s claimed trademark rights and give the parties an opportunity
to resolve the matter without need for formal legal action.118 Of course, if
infringers or misusers do not cease and desist their activity, the trademark
owner has the right to sue. The Lanham Act provides causes of action for
infringement of both federally registered119 and unregistered120
trademarks.
In recent years, some brands have undertaken creative enforcement
methods by employing marketing techniques. For example, Anheuser
Busch InBev launched its “Dilly Dilly” campaign for its Bud Light brand
in 2017, which combined medieval times and ice cold beer.121 The
marketing campaign was a success122 and became so popular that a craft
brewer in Minnesota adopted the “Dilly Dilly” phrase as the name for a

115. “The TTAB is an administrative board that hears and decides adversary proceedings between
two parties, namely, oppositions (party opposes a mark after publication in the Official Gazette) and
cancellations (party seeks to cancel an existing registration).” Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/ttab
[http://perma.cc/RZ86-NL2F].
116. Id. Additionally, a trademark owner may initiate a cancellation proceeding before the TTAB
for a registered mark. Id.
117. Cease-and-desist letters are “commonplace in trademark policing practice.” Jessica E. Lanier,
Note, Effective Policing: Giving Trademark Holders a Pre-Emptive Strike Against “Genericide,” 20
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 247, 262 (2014).
118. Policing Your Trademark or Service Mark, HINCKLEY ALLEN (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.hinckleyallen.com/publications/policing-your-trademark-or-service-mark/
[https://perma.cc/5DV2-UH9E].
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
120. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
121. Graham Flanagan & Tanya Dua, Bud Light’s ‘Dilly Dilly’ Just Made a Comeback at the Super
Bowl with a Weird Crossover Ad with Game of Thrones — Here’s What the Phrase Means, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2019, 4:32 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/bud-light-dilly-dilly-viralcommercial-super-bowl-campaign-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/K6TX-YHKW].
122. Tae Kim, Beer Sales Are Rising, Helped by Bud Light’s ‘Dilly Dilly’ Popularity, CNBC (June
27, 2018, 3:04 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/27/morgan-stanley-says-beer-sales-are-risinghelped-by-dilly-dilly-ads.html [https://perma.cc/2EUT-AEMA].

La (Do Not Delete)

682

6/10/21 11:02 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:667

new double IPA.123 Rather than sending a standard cease-and-desist letter,
Anheuser Busch InBev combatted infringement on its “Dilly Dilly” catch
phrase by sending an actor dressed as a medieval “town crier” to read a
cease-and-desist scroll of parchment.124 Rather than conveying the usual
lawsuit threats, the town crier warned that continued use of the phrase
would result in a “private tour of the pit of misery.”125 Similarly, Velcro
combatted genericide by creating a video reminding people to not use its
“Velcro” trademark as a general noun to describe all “hook and loop”
fasteners.126 And Xerox spent a substantial amount of time and money on
an educational campaign to “raise awareness that ‘Xerox’” is a trademark,
not a verb to be used to refer to photocopying.127 In addition to combatting
genericide and trademark infringement or misuse, these non-traditional
means of enforcement help trademark owners to gain positive marketing
and publicity.
III. THE RISE OF THE TRADEMARK BULLY
When trademark enforcement goes too far, it results in “trademark
bullying.”128 Such tactics often involve overreaching claims of
infringement and misuse. This Part explains the concept of bullying using

123. Robert Young, Going “Medieval” on Trademark Enforcement, JD SUPRA (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/going-medieval-on-trademark-enforcement-37189/
[https://perma.cc/3KBB-2W4Q].
124. The video is available on the Minnesota crafter brewer’s Facebook page. This author highly
recommends taking the time to view the video, as it is very amusing, and an illuminating example of
new methods of enforcement. Modist Brewing Company, That Moment When Bud Light Sends You
a Cease and Desist for Your #dillydilly Release, FACEBOOK (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1769474706456277 [https://perma.cc/DJ9L-8VP2]; see also,
Young, supra note 123 (explaining the situation leading Anheuser Busch InBev to send a town crier
to the Minnesotan craft brewer); Jess Baker, Dilly, Dilly: Cease and Desist to Craft Brewer Goes
Viral, CRAFTBEER.COM (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.craftbeer.com/editors-picks/dilly-dilly-beergiant-delivers-viral-cease-desist-modist-brewing [https://perma.cc/8SLF-MHJL] (describing
Anheuser Busch InBev’s town crier’s speech).
125. Young, supra note 123.
126. Holly Ramer, Velcro’s Video Implores Consumers to Say ‘Hook and Loop,’ USA TODAY
(Apr. 4, 208, 8:32 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/26/velcros-videoimplores-consumers-say-hook-and-loop/705667001/ [https://perma.cc/7UPL-EM23].
127. Margaret Walker, Xerox: Avoiding a ‘Genericide’ Headache, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV.
(May 17, 2016), https://www.worldipreview.com/article/xerox-avoiding-a-genericide-headache
[https://perma.cc/N2K8-QXJ4].
128. See Roxana Sullivan & Luke Curran, Trademark Bullying: Defending Your Brand or
Vexatious Business Tactics?, IPWATCHDOG (July 16, 2015), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/
16/trademark-bullying-defending-your-brand-or-vexatious-business-tactics/id=59155/
[https://perma.cc/UB4H-JY7K] (defining trademark bullies—or trademark trolls—as those who
“aggressively assert rights beyond the scope of trademark protection afforded by the Lanham Act
through the issuance of threatening cease-and-desist letters”).
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Adidas—an owner that some have dubbed a bully—as a case study. This
Part also discusses some potential explanations for trademark bullying.
Because trademark owners maintain their trademark rights through
self-policing and enforcement, “[t]rademark bullying is a touchy
problem.”129 It is unclear where reasonable enforcement ends and
trademark bullying begins. Thus, attempts to address trademark bullying
must “avoid putting trademark owners into a double-bind in which the
lines are blurry and both failure to police and excessively aggressive
policing lead to sanctions or loss of rights.”130
A.

Adidas: A Case Study

Adidas’s131 litigiousness has earned it the label of trademark bully.132
Adidas, the world’s third most valuable apparel brand,133 is well-known
for its “three-stripes” trademark.134 Adidas met all the requirements
129. Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 853, 858 (2012).
130. Id.
131. The brand name and trademark “adidas” begins with a lower case “a,” but for ease of reading
and uniformity, this Comment uses an upper case “A.”
132. Complaint at 2, 11, Forever 21, Inc. v. Adidas Am., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01752 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
3, 2017); see also Katie M. Brown & Natasha T. Brison, A Tale of Two Trademarks: A US Analysis
of the Protection Strategies of Adidas and Converse, 16 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 1, 4 (2018) (noting that
“Adidas has been accused of being a trademark bully” and explaining the arguments behind that
statement); Steve Baird, Stripe Three, Adidas Called a Trademark Bully, DUETSBLOG (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.duetsblog.com/2017/03/articles/articles/stripe-three-adidas-called-a-trademark-bully/
[https://perma.cc/6LQM-QN46] (explaining Forever 21’s allegations against Adidas of trademark
bullying); Four Stripe Fight: Will FC Barcelona’s Newest Thom Browne Uniforms Give Rise to a
Legal Battle With adidas?, THE FASHION L. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/fourstripes-will-fc-barcelonas-new-thom-browne-uniforms-give-rise-to-a-fight-with-adidas/
[https://perma.cc/JCB5-2WL4] (giving examples of Adidas’s litigiousness and opining on whether
FC Barcelona’s four-striped uniform would attract Adidas’s attention).
133. According to Brand Finance, Adidas was worth just shy of $16.5 billion and is the third most
valuable apparel brand in the world as of 2020, after Nike (first most valuable) and Gucci (second
most valuable). BRAND FIN., APPAREL 50, 2020, at 11 (2020), https://brandirectorypublic.s3.eu-west2.amazonaws.com/reports_free/brand-finance-apparel-50-2019-preview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BA4Q-4VNK].
134. In the 1920s, Adolf “Adi” Dassler began making sports shoes, and soon after sold cleats by
adding “hand forged spikes” to appeal to athletes. When Arthur Jonath became the first athlete to win
a medal in Adidas shoes when he placed third in the 100 meters during the 1932 Olympic Games,
Adidas recognized the opportunity to access a global market and began demarcating its shoes with
three stripes so that those viewing the games would know what brands the medalists preferred. And
in 1949, the world-famous three-stripes trademark was born, appearing on track shoes for the first
time. By marking its shoes with the stripes, Adidas announced to the world that the medalists preferred
its shoes. Adidas’ Olympic History, ADIDAS (Aug. 5, 2000), https://www.adidasgroup.com/en/media/news-archive/press-releases/2000/adidas-olympic-history/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2021); BARBARA SMIT, SNEAKER WARS: THE ENEMY BROTHERS WHO FOUNDED ADIDAS AND PUMA
AND THE FAMILY FEUD THAT FOREVER CHANGED THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 3–5, 31–33 (2008).
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needed to register its three-stripes mark in the U.S. by 1994.135 Since then,
Adidas has spent millions of dollars on promoting the three-stripes mark,
which continues to signify Adidas products to consumers today.136
In addition to promotion efforts, Adidas protects its three-stripes
trademark through intense enforcement efforts.137 Litigation involving
infringement of the three-stripes mark is based on Adidas’s 1994
trademark registration.138 Even though the three-stripes trademark is not
distinctive, Adidas has built up its trademark’s strength over the years. As
one court described, the three-stripes trademark is arbitrary because “three
stripes do not define, describe[,] or suggest the various products that bear
them.”139 However, another court explained that although “the spectrum
of distinctiveness does not easily translate into the world of shapes and
images . . . the [three-stripe] Mark is strong and entitled to protection.”140

135. ADIDAS THREE-STRIPES MARK, Registration No. 1,815,956; Adidas-Am., Inc. v.
Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1040 (D. Or. 2008). The mark was first registered in
Germany in 1949. Adidas’ Olympic History, supra note 134. However, the Finnish shoe brand, Karhu
Sports, was using the same mark. The story goes that, in order to settle the dispute, “Adi Dassler
purchased the brand’s iconic three-stripes trademark” from Karhu “for a sum equivalent to 1,600
euros and two bottles of whiskey.” Bernhard Warner, After Stunning Ruling, Adidas’ Iconic Logo
Could Lose Some Trademark Protection in EU, FORTUNE (June 20, 2019, 1:16 PM),
https://fortune.com/2019/06/20/adidas-trademark-invalid-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/4LWZ-27QH];
Three Stripes and Karhu, KARHU, https://karhu.com/blog/three-stripes-trademark-sold-to-adidas/
[https://perma.cc/NQE7-JZ68]. Adidas began using the three-stripes trademark “[a]t least as early as
1952 . . . on footwear sold in the United States and worldwide.” Complaint at 10, Adidas Am., Inc. v.
Skechers USA, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 1222 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-01741). In 1957, Adidas
obtained U.S. registration for the wordmark ADIDAS THE MARK WITH THE 3 STRIPES, likely
in an effort to market their logo and acquire the secondary meaning necessary to register the threestripes mark itself. ADIDAS THE MARK WITH THE 3 STRIPES, Registration No. 0641906.
136. Complaint at 14, Skechers, 149 F. Supp. 3d 1222 (No. 3:15-cv-01741) [hereinafter
Skechers Complaint].
137. See Payless Shoesource, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1041. Between 1995 and 2008, Adidas pursued
enforcement of its three-stripes mark over 325 times, including filing thirty-five separate infringement
lawsuits and entering into over forty-five settlement agreements with other footwear companies. Id.
138. Id. at 1040.
139. Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., No. 3:01-cv-01582-RE, 2003 WL 25710435, at *13 (D.
Or. Jan. 29, 2003).
140. Payless Shoesource, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
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Figure 1:
Adidas’s first registration for its three-stripes mark.141

Adidas has filed multiple lawsuits against other shoe manufacturers for
selling shoes bearing stripes that, as Adidas believes, constitute
infringement of its own three-stripes mark.142
For example, Adidas sued Skechers in 2015, in part for trademark
infringement, because the alleged infringing shoe had perforations on the
side of the shoe that simulated stripes.143

141. ADIDAS THREE-STRIPES MARK, Registration No. 1,815,956. The registration consists of
“three parallel and equidistant double-serrated stripes of contrasting color on the side of the shoe
running diagonally from the mid-sole forward to the shoelaces.” Payless Shoesource, 546 F. Supp.
2d at 1040.
142. Four Stripe Fight, supra note 132.
143. Adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., 890 F.3d 747, 752–53 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Figure 2:
Adidas’s Stan Smith shoe (left) and
Skechers’s Onix shoe (right)144

And, in a surprising display of trademark strength, Adidas was
successful in a case against Payless Shoesource for selling shoes that had
two and four stripes—even though the Adidas trademark includes three
stripes.145 Adidas claimed that Payless’s shoes constituted trademark
infringement and dilution.146 The court denied Payless’s motion for
summary judgment, finding that use of two and four stripes on shoes
presented a likelihood of confusion.147 At the end of trial, a jury awarded
Adidas over $304 million148—possibly a record-breaking jury award for
a trademark infringement case.149

144. Skechers Complaint, supra note 136, at 2.
145. Payless Shoesource, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
146. Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1225 (D. Or. 2007).
147. Id. at 1235–36.
148. “The jury determined adidas was entitled to: (1) actual damages in the form of a 7.78 percent
royalty, totaling $30.6 million; (2) a $137 million accounting of Payless’ profits; and (3) punitive
damages of $137 million.” Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. CV 01-1655-KI, 2008
WL 4279812, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2008).
149. Although the court later reduced the award to $65 million, commentators noted that the
original amount may have been the largest ever jury award for a trademark infringement lawsuit.
Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. 01-1655-KI, 2009 WL 302246, at *8 (D. Or. Feb.
9, 2009); Debra Cassens Weiss, Adidas Award of $305M in Trademark Infringement Case May Be
Record, A.B.A. J. (May 7, 2008, 4:14 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/adidas_award
_of_305m_in_trademark_infringement_case_may_be_record [https://perma.cc/S7HR-QLBV].
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Figure 3:
Adidas’s Superstar shoe (left) and Payless’s shoe (right)150

Yet, some of Adidas’s efforts to combat infringement of its threestripes mark begs the question: Are consumers really going to be
confused? For example, Adidas has filed suit against Abercrombie &
Fitch for selling striped clothing,151 and against Target for selling footwear
with two and four stripes.152 Adidas also opposed the trademark
registration of the FC Barcelona logo.153 The Spanish soccer team had
filed registration of its logo in preparation for a new partnership with
Nike.154 The opposition led FC Barcelona to abandon its U.S. trademark
application.155 And, in one of the most surprising enforcement actions yet,
Adidas attempted to oppose Tesla Motors, Inc.’s application for a
trademark that consisted of three horizontal stylized stripes.156 The
application was for the logo of the car company’s Model 3 vehicle.157
Interestingly, the opposition proceeding did not move forward because
150. Third Amended Complaint at 10, Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. 3:01-cv01655-KI (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2006).
151. In 2004, Adidas filed a trademark infringement suit against Abercrombie & Fitch, asserting
that the retailer was selling garments bearing Adidas trademark-protected stripe design. Abercrombie
& Fitch had been on the receiving end of multiple cease-and-desist letters from Adidas. Complaint at
7–10, Adidas Am., Inc. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 3:04-cv-1866-RE (D. Or. Dec. 23, 2004).
152. Adidas sued Target in 2008, alleging that Target infringed its three-stripes mark by way of
footwear bearing two and four parallel stripes. In its complaint, Adidas asserted that Target had
violated more than one of the settlement agreements that they had entered into in connection with
previously-filed trademark suits, including a February 2003 settlement in which Target agreed to
refrain from selling infringing striped products. Complaint at 12–14, Adidas Am., Inc. v. Target Corp.,
No. 3:08-cv-01140 (D. Or. Sept. 30, 2008).
153. The FC Barcelona mark consisted of “a square containing seven vertical stripes (the 1st, 3rd,
5th and 7th stripes from the left are blue, and the remaining three stripes are garnet).” Four Stripe
Fight, supra note 132.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Notice of Opposition, Adidas AG v. Tesla Motors, Inc., No. 91232672 (T.T.A.B. 2017).
157. Jillian Stampher, Court Documents Show Tesla Tweaked Its Model 3 Logo Amid a Trademark
Fight with Adidas, GEEK WIRE (Feb. 7, 2017, 12:22 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/2017/courtdocuments-show-tesla-tweaked-model-3-logo-amid-trademark-fight-adidas/
[https://perma.cc/6KMT-TF5K].
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Tesla opted to forego the stripes and use “3” as the logo instead. Tesla
denied that the decision was in reaction to Adidas’s opposition, stating
that the last-minute change was “strictly a Tesla branding decision and not
a response to the trademark issue.”158
Adidas’s litigation tactics thus far seem successful. Brands have
learned to tread carefully around the three-stripes mark. However, there is
a growing frustration with Adidas’s aggressive tactics, especially within
the fashion industry.159 One especially outspoken response came from the
“fast fashion”160 retailer Forever 21.161 Forever 21 filed for declaratory
judgment on March 3, 2017, in response to a cease-and-desist letter
demanding that Forever 21 cease sales of specific clothing items adorned
with stripes.162 Forever 21 claimed that it was a “victim to Adidas’s
threats” of trademark litigation against “virtually any item of clothing with
decorative stripes.”163 Calling Adidas a “bully,” Forever 21 requested the
court issue judgment declaring that Forever 21’s striped clothing does not
infringe Adidas’s three-stripes mark.164
Adidas is just one among a growing number of trademark owners that
are facing criticisms of trademark bullying.165 And, as many legal
158. Jon Fingas, Adidas Thinks Tesla’s Old Model 3 Logo Is a Little Too Familiar, ENGADGET
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/02/08/adidas-trademark-dispute-with-tesla/
[https://perma.cc/Q7NH-6DU3]; see also Stampher, supra note 157 (explaining that “[a] Tesla
spokesman . . . [said] the company withdrew the application based on separate branding decisions”).
159. See Sangeeta Singh-Kurtz, Adidas Has Sued Pretty Much Everyone Who Has Used Stripes,
QUARTZ (June 21, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/adidas-sued-pretty-much-everyone120057012.html [https://perma.cc/U8D7-33C9] (“Adidas is notorious for taking just about anyone to
court who dares to use stripes.”); Complaint at 1, Forever 21, Inc. v. Adidas Am., Inc., No. 2:17-cv01752-GW-SK (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Forever 21 Complaint].
160. “Fast fashion is a design, manufacturing, and marketing method focused on rapidly producing
high volumes of clothing.” Audrey Stanton, What Is Fast Fashion, Anyway?, THE GOOD TRADE,
https://www.thegoodtrade.com/features/what-is-fast-fashion [https://perma.cc/S5EU-44EB].
161. Forever 21 Complaint, supra note 159, at 1.
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 1.
164. Id. at 2, 11. On March 13, 2017, Forever 21 abandoned the lawsuit. Adidas had filed a separate
infringement lawsuit against Forever 21. Rather than litigating both cases at once, Forever 21 decided
to pursue its request for declaratory judgment as a counterclaim in Adidas’s infringement action.
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 1, Forever 21, Inc. v. Adidas Am., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01752-GWSK (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017).
165. See, e.g., Move Over Adidas, Levi’s Is the New Trademark “Bully,” Per Barbour Lawsuit,
THE FASHION L. (June 11, 2018), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/move-over-adidas-levis-is-thenew-trademark-bully-per-barbour-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/A4ZK-CC8J] (discussing allegations
against Levi Strauss of trademark bullying); Kyle Jahner, Disney’s Rap as Trademark Bully Revived
in Baby Yoda Crackdown, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
bloomberglawnews/ip-law/XA66O6J0000000?bna_news_filter=ip-law#jcite
[https://perma.cc/Z5GS-F9K8] (discussing allegations against Disney of trademark bullying); Peter
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commentators and scholars have noted, the issue with increased
aggressive trademark enforcement and tenuous, overreaching claims is
only getting worse—likely because of how courts interpret the boundaries
of trademark laws.166
B.

Trademark Bullies as Rational Decisionmakers

Legal commentators have identified trademark bullying as a byproduct
of a system that encourages aggressive trademark enforcement.167 A
common thread amongst these commentaries is the role of trademark
strength. Trademark strength “can determine the scope of protection it
receives” because such marks are more likely to succeed in infringement
litigation.168 While courts do not assign a specific measurement to
trademark strength, they often discuss whether a mark is strong or weak
when conducting a likelihood-of-confusion analysis.169
Lemire, Chick-Fil-A—The Tale of a Trademark Bully, LEYENDECKER & LEMIRE, LLC (Dec. 29,
2011), https://www.coloradoiplaw.com/chick-fil-a-the-tale-of-a-trademark-bully/
[https://perma.cc/G742-MSQM] (discussing allegations against Chick-Fil-A for trademark bullying);
Steve Baird, How Fashionable Is the Louis Vuitton “Trademark Bully” Label?, DUETSBLOG (Mar.
12, 2012), https://www.duetsblog.com/2012/03/articles/trademarks/how-fashionable-is-the-louisvuitton-trademark-bully-label-2/ [https://perma.cc/E2WF-PYXQ] (discussing allegations against
Louis Vuitton for trademark bullying); Facebook Hit With “Trademark Bullying” Claim, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REV. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.worldipreview.com/news/facebook-hit-withtrademark-bullying-claim-6300 [https://perma.cc/Q4RV-AG36] (discussing allegations against
Facebook for trademark bullying).
166. See infra notes 195–199 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 10, at 1318–19 (explaining the ways in which trademark doctrines
encourages trademark overreach); Connie Davis Nichols & Charley Carroll, Trouble in Trademark
Law: How Applying Different Theories Leaves Door Open for Abuse, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
1, 5 (2014) (stating that the trademark system awards those with financial resources to police and
protect trademarks); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity
of Values and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427, 461–63 (2011) (stating that courts’
discussions of a duty to police provides an incentive to trademark owners to over-police their marks).
168. Mireles, supra note 167, at 460; Beebe & Hemphill, supra note 109; see also One Indus., LLC
v. Jim O’Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Trademark law offers greater
protection to marks that are ‘strong.’” (quoting E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d
1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992))); Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l Select Grp., Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335
(11th Cir. 1999) (“The stronger the mark, the greater the scope of protection accorded it, the weaker
the mark, the less trademark protection it receives.”); Timothy Denny Greene & Jeff Wilkerson,
Understanding Trademark Strength, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 535, 544 (2013) (“[T]he stronger a
mark, the wider its scope of protection and thus the more third-party uses it can block from the stream
of commerce.”).
169. While the circuits have adopted different approaches for determining likelihood-of-confusion,
trademark strength is considered in each circuit’s analysis. See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de
Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.,
287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983);
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys.,
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Distinctiveness can implicate a trademark’s strength, but it is not
dispositive and the method by which a mark meets the distinctiveness
requirement does not necessarily indicate trademark strength for
enforcement purposes.170 For example, an inherently distinctive mark that
is immediately registerable is not necessarily stronger than a descriptive
mark that has acquired distinctiveness.171
Courts also consider a variety of other types of evidence when
assessing trademark strength. Trademark owners can demonstrate the
strength of their mark through direct evidence—such as consumer
surveys—or circumstantial evidence—such as evidence of advertising
expenditures or sales.172 Additionally, courts may look to the “amount of
third party usage of the particular mark in connection with the same or
similar goods” when weighing trademark strength.173 In fact, some courts
go so far as to view policing and enforcement efforts as evidence of a
stronger mark.174 While third-party use of a mark may erode the mark and
thereby indicate that a mark is weak, Professor Michael S. Mireles175
contends that “[t]he courts’ consideration of evidence of a mark’s strength
Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc.,
670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325,
1330 (7th Cir. 1977); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated in part on other grounds by Mattel,
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Sally Beauty Co. v. BeautyCo, Inc.,
304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002); Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984);
Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 352 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (considering
trademark strength under the fame factor and noting that “strong marks enjoy a wide latitude of legal
protection”).
170. Greene & Wilkerson, supra note 168, at 537.
171. Id.
172. Mireles, supra note 167, at 460.
173. Id. at 461.
174. Id.; see also Am. ORT, Inc. v. ORT Israel, No. 07 CV 2332, 2007 WL 2049733, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2007) (policing of mark supported a finding of a strong mark); Renaissance
Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 680, 692 (E.D. Va. 2005) (noting
that a trademark’s common use is a factor in considering trademark strength), aff’d, 227 F. App’x 239
(4th Cir. 2007); Gateway, Inc. v. Companion Prods., Inc., No. Civ. 01-4096-KES, 2003 WL
22508907, at *6 (D.S.D. Aug. 19, 2003) (relying on evidence of cease and desist letters and litigation
to find a mark strong); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
2d 427, 459 (D.N.J. 2000) (active policing program considered as proof of trademark strength), aff’d,
269 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001); Gideons Int’l, Inc. v. Gideon 300 Ministries, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 566,
583 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (trademark owner’s enforcement efforts, including cease-and-desist letters
considered as evidence trademark strength); Hester Indus., Inc. v. Wing King, Inc., No. 1:91-CV2644-RHH, 1992 WL 200129, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1992) (considering policing efforts to find
that trademark is strong), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992).
175. Michael S. Mireles is a professor at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law and
teaches courses on intellectual property law, Property and Wills & Trusts. Mireles, Michael, UNIV.
OF THE PAC.: CAMPUS DIRECTORY, https://law.pacific.edu/campus-directory/mireles-michael
[https://perma.cc/KWQ6-CAPV].
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by examining” third-party use of the mark “is particularly troubling
because it provides an incentive for mark holders to police potentially
infringing uses outside their markets.”176 To combat this, Professor
Mireles suggests that courts steer away from considering policing efforts
when assessing the scope of trademark rights.177
Additionally, Professor Connie Davis Nichols178 and Charley Carroll179
argue that trademark law “favors those with the financial resources to
spare” because trademark enforcement and litigation are costly.180 Due to
high enforcement costs, larger companies with strong market power end
up as the most zealous enforcers.181 Meanwhile, smaller players who may
be the target of infringement lawsuits do not have the power to fight such
allegations, even if the claim against them is weak.182
Professor Nichols and Carroll attribute this imbalance to two
competing theories of trademark law.183 The first theory—the foundation
of trademark law—is concerned with trademarks’ role in identifying the
source of goods or services to prevent consumer confusion and competitor
counterfeit.184 Under this first theory, trademarks are a mechanism for
consumer protection.185 Conversely, the second theory views trademarks
as a method of protecting a business’s goodwill.186 Under this second
theory, trademarks are meant to protect trademark owners—which
essentially means protecting corporations.187 Courts have increasingly
adopted this second theory of trademark law, thereby expanding
trademark doctrines that incentivize trademark enforcement.188
Increasingly incentivized to enforce, trademark owners run the risk of
pursuing overreaching claims and trademark bullying. Professor Nichols
and Carroll suggest that courts should “impose sanctions for excessive
176. Mireles, supra note 167, at 461–63 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 499.
178. Connie Powell Nichols is a professor at Baylor Law School and teaches courses on Advance
Trademark Practice & Litigation, Copyright Law, E-Commerce, and Information Privacy Law.
Connie Powell Nichols, BAYLOR UNIV.: L. FAC. & STAFF, https://www.baylor.edu/law/
facultystaff/index.php?id=933656 [https://perma.cc/Y2SB-TUHE].
179. Charley Carroll is a licensed Texas attorney who graduated in 2011 from Baylor Law School
with a concentration in Intellectual Property. Nichols & Carroll, supra note 167, at 1.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 5–6
184. Id. at 8–9.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 20.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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policing, where claims . . . are superficial or speculative.”189
Professor Stacey Dogan190 explains how the U.S. trademark system
financially incentivizes owners to assert trademark claims.191 “The
vagueness of trademark law’s boundaries” lends credence to what would
otherwise seem to be tenuous claims.192 And trademark owners are further
propelled towards litigious activity because of “the notion that ‘stronger’
trademarks get more robust legal rights than ‘weaker’ ones.”193 Professor
Dogan notes that parties are afforded broader legal protection if they can
“creat[e] space between their marks and others—even when those others
sell products that bear no relation to the trademark holder’s.”194 Thus,
trademark bullies act rationally under current trademark law “not because
they risk losing their marks” if they do not enforce, “but because their
rights will be more valuable if their objection succeeds.”195
IV. TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT SHOULD PLAY NO ROLE IN
DETERMINING TRADEMARK STRENGTH
Trademark owners rightfully engage in policing to prevent trademark
infringement that may cause consumer confusion or trademark misuse
that could lead to genericide.196 However, as this Part argues, when courts
view instances of policing and enforcement as evidence of a strong mark,
incentives to enforce become perverse and lead to trademark bullying.
Instead, courts should not consider trademark policing and enforcement
as evidence of trademark strength. This Comment thus extends Professor
Mireles’s proposal197 and argues that removing policing and enforcement
evidence from trademark strength analyses altogether will reduce
trademark bullying incentives and better serve the original goal of
trademark law—consumer protection.
The roots of U.S. trademark law, even before a formal law existed,
were based on consumer protection.198 Consumer protection is best served
when competition is encouraged, not chilled. But trademark bullying is
189. Id. at 29.
190. Stacey Dogan is a professor at Boston University School of Law and focuses on intellectual
property, competition, and technology law. Stacey Dogan, BOS. UNIV. SCH. OF L.,
https://www.bu.edu/law/profile/stacey-dogan/ [https://perma.cc/3STV-NZDM].
191. Dogan, supra note 10, at 1316–22.
192. Id. at 1316.
193. Id. at 1319.
194. Id.
195. Id. (emphasis omitted).
196. See supra section II.A.
197. See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
198. See Bone, supra note 1, at 549; Nichols & Carroll, supra note 167, at 4, 9–11.
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problematic because it chills competition.199 And even where competition
does arise, a cease-and-desist letter or litigation is likely to quickly snuff
it out. Additionally, proof of policing and enforcement does not logically
indicate trademark strength; it does not show that a trademark is more
recognizable to consumers or unlikely to confuse consumers faced with
two similar marks. All it proves is that the company had the resources to
undertake the policing and enforcement efforts. To further consumer
protection, then, courts and the USPTO should stop considering evidence
of enforcement efforts when determining whether a mark is strong
and distinctive.
For a trademark owner like Adidas, a strong mark matters. To retain
and increase that strength, the current trademark system incentivizes
Adidas to continue its litigious behavior regardless of consumer
confusion. There would likely be very few consumers who would have
mistaken Tesla’s vehicle as one made or sponsored by Adidas, even if
three stripes adorned Tesla’s vehicle. Yet, who can reasonably blame
Adidas for operating within a system that incentivizes this behavior?
When assessing trademark strength, courts should explicitly place
more weight on actual consumer perception, measured through consumer
surveys and evidence of advertising. This encourages trademark owners
to build trademark strength through positive marketing efforts to improve
brand awareness. Building trademark strength through marketing, rather
than by preventing competition, aligns with the original purpose of the
trademark—signaling the source of the goods to protect consumers.
Further, moving away from weighing enforcement when assessing
trademark strength benefits trademarks’ goodwill. Under current methods
of assessment, trademark owners must make a difficult decision: either
take a more conservative approach to enforcement, but risk erosion of
trademark strength, or aggressively enforce, but suffer vilification from
competitors and consumers.200 If trademark law is meant to help owners
protect goodwill, courts should not force companies to choose between
having a weak trademark or being viewed by competitors and consumers

199. Jessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in
Trademark Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 211 (2014) (“Trademark bullying
harms competition and chills the free speech interests of those seeking to use trademarks for criticism
and parody as permitted by the fair use doctrine.”); Manta, supra note 129, at 855 (“Trademark
bullying engenders a number of costs for society.”); Dogan, supra note 10, at 1294 (stating that under
the current trademark regime, “rights-holders are asserting unreasonable claims and chilling
legitimate conduct”); Mireles, supra note 167, at 434 (explaining how “[t]he danger of the chilling of
activity beneficial to the public is great” when trademark owners are overly litigious).
200. See, e.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 625
(discussing how those with less market power may use shaming as a defense mechanism against
trademark bullying).
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as a bully.
This proposal to eliminate evidence of trademark enforcement in
assessing trademark strength does not imply that all trademark
enforcement is negative. In fact, as discussed earlier, trademark
enforcement is the means by which trademark owners assert their rights
and protect their trademark’s goodwill.201 Trademark enforcement and
policing are necessary to detect behavior that harms consumers or causes
consumer confusion.202 Additionally, this proposal does not discount
evidence of trademark enforcement from all infringement-related
lawsuits. Courts should still consider evidence of trademark enforcement
when assessing other trademark issues like the equitable defense
of laches.203
If trademark owners enforced their rights only where actual
infringement or risk of consumer confusion occurs, they would be able to
instead focus their resources and energy on positive marketing. And even
where some enforcement is necessary, perhaps companies could consider
less litigious paths and instead hire a town crier.204
CONCLUSION
Currently, courts consider trademark enforcement practices when
analyzing trademark strength. This encourages trademark owners to
aggressively enforce their marks, often leading to overreaching trademark
claims and trademark bullying. Aggressive enforcement tactics chill
competition, which negatively impacts consumers. Because trademark
law exists to protect consumers, courts and the USPTO should place less
emphasis on enforcement when determining the strength of a trademark.
Instead, emphasis should be placed on marketing efforts and actual
consumer protection.

201. See supra Introduction and section II.A.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.

